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stantial, "indirect" effect upon wholesale gas prices. The construction
of the interstate commerce clause in 1938 in the Champlin case is
also dubious authority for the proposition that the federal government is restricted from interfering with allowable orders. The theory
that production is a mining operation and thus not a part of interstate commerce is an antiquated interpretation of the commerce
clause." The full ramifications of the Northern case will depend on
whether the court uses it (1) as a spring board to extend federal
control under the Natural Gas Act to ratable production orders or
(2) as authority for distinguishing between orders directed at purchasers and those directed at producers.
Robert C. Gist

Robinson Patman Act - Oil Suppliers' Subsidies
to Dealers During Price Wars
Sun Oil Co., a major integrated refiner and distributor of petroleum products, sold gasoline through thirty-eight independent lesseeoperated stations in Jacksonville, Florida. Super Test Oil Co., a retail service station chain,' opened a station across the street from one
of Sun's company-owned and lessee-operated retail outlets. In response to complaints from its dealer, McLean, that he was being
forced out of business by Super Test's recurrent price cutting activities, Sun reduced its wholesale price to McLean but not to its
other retail outlets in the Jacksonville area. This action constituted
a violation of the Robinson Patman Act's' prohibition against price
discrimination between customers. Sun raised the defense that it
had met, in good faith, the equally low price of a competitor. Held:
Enterprises that do not operate on the same functional level are not
competitors within the meaning of the good faith defense of the
" The change in the Courts' interpretation of the interstate commerce clause since the
Champlin case can be seen in the decisions subsequent to 1940. In one case, the Court said
that the power of the federal government under the commerce clause "extends to those
activities intrastate which so effect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of
Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the achievement of
a legitimate end." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see also United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Wilshire Oil Co., 9 F. Supp. 396 (S.D. Cal.
1934), appeal dismissed, 77 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1935), appeal dismissed, 295 U.S. 100
(1935).
, The court of appeals assumed that Super Test was an integrated supplier-retailer. Sun
Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465, 466-67, 474 (5th Cir. 1961). The Supreme Court noted
that the record did not support this conclusion and assumed, alternatively, that Super Test
was engaged solely in retail operations. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 512 n.7 (1963).
See text accompanying note 39 infra.
249 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
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Robinson-Patman Act. Thus, a supplier of gasoline (Sun) is not
a competitor of a purely retail outlet (Super Test). FTC v. Sun Oil
Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963), reversing 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961).
I. THE PROBLEM

The principal case has significance for the oil industry in that it
partially defines how far and in what directions a major supplier can
go in insulating its dealers from the effects of gasoline price wars.
Going beyond the specific fact situation of the principal case, the
Court indicated that the good faith defense may be available to a
supplier giving a price cut to its dealer if the competing outlet
either is an integrated supplier-retailer or has received an enabling
price cut from another supplier." It also may be possible to avoid
violation of the Act by granting discounts to all dealers in an area
in such a manner that none of the supplier's customers (dealers) are
injured.! Finally, there is an alternative course open to the supplier
of either operating an outlet on a consignment basis or combining
direct retailing with its other operations and thus directly competing
with the price cutting retailer.' Each of these avenues involves serious
legal questions which have not been fully resolved. The problem is
to examine the legality of these various courses of action in the light
of the Sun Oil decision.
II.

COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT

A. Section 2 (a) -- CriteriaTo Establish A Violation
Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the RobinsonPatman Act, makes it unlawful for:
[A]ny person . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers
of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such

discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either

of them.' (Emphasis added.)
The requisite discrimination exists if a seller charging different prices
'National

Petroleum News, Fact Book, Mid-May 1963, p. 265.

U.S. at 512.
id. at 526-27.
'A supplier who consigns gasoline to a dealer retains legal title to the product and
merely pays the dealer a commission for marketing it. See Atlantic Ref. Co., 1961-1963
Trade Reg. Rep. 5 16422, at 21287 (May 16, 1963); Sun Oil Co., 1961-1963 Trade Reg.
Rep. 5 16418, at 21279 n.1 (May 15, 1963).
749 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. S 13(a) (Supp. IV 1959-62).
4371

5
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is in competition with other sellers or if his customers who are in
competition with each other are charged different prices for goods
of like grade and quality! The term "may be" permits application
of the statute to discriminations which, if continued, probably would
have the effect of substantially lessening competition.! Significantly,
any perceptible lessening of competition has been held to the substantial."0 The circumstances indicating the probability of the adverse
competitive effects can involve either the line of commerce in which
the seller is engaged (primary line)," the line of commerce in
which the seller's customers are engaged (secondary line),1" or the
line of commerce in which purchasers from the seller's favored customers are engaged (third line)."
At least two types of primary line situations can arise in which
there is a substantial lessening of competition. (1) One seller or
several sellers may use discriminatory practices to destroy the smaller
competitors, or one seller may systematically meet prices or establish punitive prices in reprisal for smaller sellers' independence in
initiating price reductions.' (2) With absence of predatory intent,
a monopolistic or dominant seller may cause substantial dislocation
in the market through discriminatory pricing maneuvers." Injury to
competition on the secondary line occurs if one or some of a supplier's customers are favored to the detriment of other competing
customers of the same supplier. The customers referred to must
compete. The cases concerning injury at the secondary level often
rely on broad inferences of injury from the existence of price differentials.' Injury to competition on the third line can exist "when
the supplier favors his distributors, whose customers compete with
'Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 13 (1963).
'Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 739 (1945); cf. Standard Fashion Co. v.
Margrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922).
" Kraft-Phenix Cheeze Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537, 544 (1937).
Inc. v. FTC, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), remanded, 289 F.2d 835 (7th
"Anheuser-Busch,
Cir. 1961). See also note 54 infra; see generally Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the
Robinson-Patman Act 113-71 (1962).
12 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). See generally Rowe, op. cit. supra
note 11, at 172-95.
"3Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263, 276 (1945), approved, Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,

173 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). See
generally Rowe, op. cit. supra note 11, at 195-205.
"Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
1Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); see Rowe, op. cit. supra note 11, at 153.
"0Rowe, op. cit. supra note 11, at 173-80. "Adverse competitive effects are most likely
inferred from stable price differentials substantial in amount, in the supplier's sales of a
standardized product, as between competing resellers to the same trade, which are in keesn
competition, and operate on tight profit margins." Id. at 181.
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other purchasers from the supplier, whereby competition with the
customer of the purchaser may be impaired.""
B. Section 2 (b) -The

Good Faith Defense

Section 2 (b) of the Act allows a supplier to rebut a prima facie
case of discrimination by "showing that his lower price.., was made
in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor ....
"
The burden of proof rests upon the party charged," but once good
faith is proved, a complete defense to the price discrimination charge
is established, even though it is shown that the price differential has
injured competition or competitors."' The good faith defense places
emphasis on individual, competitive situations and is not established
in cases in which price cuts are made automatically as part of a general pricing system2 ' or in cases in which an unlawful system is
adopted merely because a competitor maintains the same system."
The supplier must meet a "lawful" price of a competitor. The
burden of proving the lawfulness of the competitor's price does not
rest upon the supplier, but the question of whether such price is a
lawful one is relevant in establishing good faith. The seller's ultimate purpose in granting the price reduction 5 and the strength of

his competitor" are likewise revelant factors in determining good
faith. The defense has been held to be available only to a defendent
who cuts prices to retain old customers rather than to give new ones.
17 Id. at 196 n.97. "An ordinary 'secondary line' problem arises if the supplier favors
his retailer purchasers over his distributors, for then competition with the supplier's retail
customers (rather than with customers of his customers) is affected." Ibid. The leading
case exhibiting the possibility of third line injury is Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S.
231 (1951). The Court's theory behind the third line violation was that the seller's price
discount to its wholesalers allowed them to underprice him in his sales to his retail customers,
so that competition was adversely affected with the retailers receiving lower prices from
the wholesalers. The detriment resulted to the retailers who purchased directly from the
supplier at higher prices. Rowe, op. cit. supra note 11, at 196.
"s49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (Supp. IV 1959-62).
"FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945). See 80 Cong. Rec. 8241 (1936)
(remarks of Mr. Gilcrest).
25Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231
(1951).

" Ibid.
"A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
" Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). A "lawful price" is one that does
not 4itself violate the Act.
1 Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956). The FTC construes
this
requirement somewhat more harshly than the courts by requiring the seller to know the
existence of such facts as would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the
price he is meeting is a lawful one. Amercian Oil Co., 1961-1963 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 15961,
at 20789 (June 27, 1962). The seller may have to make a legal determination as to the
lawfulness of the competitor's price even in the absence of clear and controlling case precedent. Discussion Note, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 50171, at 55180 (Feb. 25, 1963).
21J. A. Folger Co., 1961-1963 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 16078 (Sept. 18, 1962).
24Forster Mfg. Co., 1961-1963 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 16243 (Jan. 3, 1963).
27Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959). Contra, Sunshine
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III. MARKETING STRUCTURE OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

A meaningful application of the functional level theory of competition, as developed in the Sun Oil decision, can be made only after
the marketing structure of the industry is examined. There are
basically three types of retail gasoline outlets-company-owned and
operated, company-owned and lessee-operated, and dealer-owned and
operated." ' In the company-owned and operated stations, the pricing
policy is the full responsibility of the supplier. Through this type
of station, a company, no matter how completely integrated, can
compete directly with retailers on their own functional level. In the
company-owned but lessee-operated stations, the pricing policy is
ultimately the responsibility of the operator, but this responsibility
is shared by the supplier. This is the type of marketing arrangement
Sun had with McLean. In the dealer-owned and operated stations,
the pricing policy is the responsibility of the retailer, although the
supplier may share it to some extent. 9 These dealers, who comprise
perhaps one-half of the total retail outlets, may be served either
directly by the supplier or through independent jobbers. Vertical
influences in price-making arise from two factors:

(a)

the sup-

plier's price makes up a large proportion of the retail price and (b)
suppliers have an important stake in the retail prices as a determinant
of their sales volume."0 These factors become especially important
during price wars because any supplier who attempts to influence
retail price-making usually provides a system of subsidies to assist
dealers in meeting the reductions of aggressive price cutters."1 Competition in the petroleum industry centers around competition among
suppliers for jobbers, competition among suppliers for locations, and
Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962); Discussion Note, 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
5 50166 (Nov. 27, 1962). See also Discussion Note, 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
50171, at
55181-82 (Feb. 25, 1963).
zsCassady, Price Making and Price Behavior in the Petroleum Industry 238-39 (1954).
" In the company-owned and lessee-operated stations, the influences the supplier has
over the retail price will reflect the terms of the lease and the services provided by the
company to the dealer. Since the company ordinarily handles the advertising for the station
and maintains certain equipment for it, the company's suggestions are likely to influence
the dealer's selection of price. In the dealer-owned and operated station, the company's influence on price is ordinarily limited to education and persuasion of dealers. See Id. at 244-46.
3 Id. at 243. For example, Sun's original price to McLean of 24.1 cents per gallon
accounted for 83.3% of the 28.9 cents per gallon McLean set as his retail price. The effect
of price on sales volume was vividly portrayed by the effect on gallonage of a 3 cent cut
in McLean's retail price. Monthly volume before the cut ran between 5,900 and 7,400
gallons; monthly volume after the cut exceeded 32,000 gallons. 371 U.S. at 509 n.4; see
National Petroleum News, Feb. 1963, p. 84.
25 Cassady, op. cit. supra note 28, at 265-66. For example, in the instant case, Sun
subsidized McLean to the tune of 1.7 cents per gallon, reducing its tankwagon price from
24.1 cents to 22.4 cents. McLean accordingly dropped his retail price 3 cents per gallon,
from 28.9 cents to 25.9 cents, himself absorbing 1.3 cents of the cut. 371 U.S. at 508-09.
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competition for customers through retail outlets. There is very little
competition, on a short term basis, among suppliers for existing retail

outlets.'
IV.

THE COURT'S DECISION

A. Rationale Of The Holding
Because there was little case precedent bearing on the situation, 3
the Court based its decision on the conviction that this interpretation of the word "competitor" was strongly suggested by a "reading
in context of the § 2 (b) proviso to give its words their normal and
usual meaning." Moreover, the Court felt that such interpretation
sa

The nature of gasoline, the necessity for its bulk merchandising, the responsibility of the refiner or supplier for advertising, the dependent relation of the
supplier on its dealers and the dealers on a single supplier make it a fiction,
or something less substantial than a legal fiction, to speak of price competition
at the oil company sale to the station level. An oil company's product competes with the products of other refiners or suppliers in the motorist's marketthrough dealer outlets. . . In gasoline marketing the supplier simply cannot
be cut off from the filling station operator and treated as if it competed only
for the business of filling stations; oil companies compete with each other for
the customer's business. Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465, 476-477 (5th
Cir. 1961).
See Brief for Respondent, pp. 20-22, FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963); see also
note 50 infra.
aa The Sun Oil decision seems consistent with what little authority exists defining the
meaning of "competitor." In Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420 (D.
Conn. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1957), the court, in deciding
whether an oil supplier could be a competitor of a retailer, held: "[E]ven though it may
be a fiction to speak of price competition at the oil company sale to the station level, the
Act does not go so far as to allow discriminatory price cutting to enable a buyer to meet
price competition, but only to enable the seller to meet a lawful price of the seller's competitor." In Bolick-Gillman v. Continental Baking Co., 206 F. Supp. 151 (D. Nev. 1961),
it was decided that a retailer, who is not a customer but merely a competitor of a retail
customer of the supplier, cannot recover for injury arising out of discrimination by the
supplier among its customers. The court rejected a theory defining competitors as those who
market the same product and adopted the theory that competitors are those who sell to
the same class of customers and operate in the same market. See Note, 15 Stan. L. Rev. 547.
Thus, no recovery can be had on a theory of injury to primary line competition since a
plaintiff must allege and prove that it was in competition with the defendant. Furthermore,
in order to recover for injury to secondary line competition, the plaintiff must allege and
show that he was a purchaser from the defendant and that he was in competition with
one or all of the favored dealers. On the other hand, the question of whether two parties
are competitors cannot be resolved by reference to mere categories or labels. In Esso Standard
Oil Co. v. Secatore's, 246 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957), a manufacturer and a wholesaler who both sold directly to the same retailer were deemed competitors; in Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co., 1961-1963 Trade Reg. Rep. 3 16365 (March
29, 1963), this rule was applied to let a wholesaler in competition with a manufacturer
bring itself within the definition of competitor in order to assert the good faith defense
to a charge of price discrimination. The basis for the Esso and Ponca holdings rests on the
fact that the parties operated on two functional levels, one of which brought then into
operation on the same functional level as the other party. This seems to be the same distinction intimated in the Sun Oil case between a supplier facing a retailer and a supplier
facing an integrated supplier-retailer. For a further discussion of this question see Note,
15 Stan. L. Rev. 547.
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was consistent with the basic policies of the nation's antitrust laws.34
The restriction of the good faith defense to those operating either
partially or solely on the same functional level tends to preserve the
initiative of the small retailer, who seeks to reduce prices, by allowing him freedom of action without fear of a retaliatory action of a
large supplier whose dealer competes with him." Lawful price reductions by a retailer are presumably a function of his own superior
merit and efficiency. According to the Court, Congress, in light of
this presumption, "intended [by the Act] to assure, to the extent
reasonably practicable, that businessmen at the same functional
level would start on equal competitive footing so far as price is
concerned." 3
In rejecting the theory that a supplier is a competitor of a retail
service station simply because its own dealer operates as a conduit
through which it competes on the retail level, the Court stated:
"[E]very retailer is but a 'conduit' for the goods which it sells and
every supplier could be considered a competitor of retailers selling
competing goods."3 The Court evidently felt that the conduit idea,
as presented, did not contain sufficient limitations and that its acceptance would so expand the good faith defense as to effect a return
to the broader "meeting competition" proviso of the Clayton Act."
On the other hand, the Court recognized that the supplier who prefers to compete for customers through independent dealers must be
allowed to insulate these dealers, on the retail level, from price cutting
effects generated by other suppliers. As the Court pointed out:
"Ifit appeared that Super Test were an integrated supplier-retailer,
or that it had received a price cut from its own supplier-presumably a competitor of Sun-we would be presented with a different
34371 U.S. at 515, 518-23.
25id. at 522.
aoId. at 520. The Court further stated:
"We discern in S 2 neither a purpose to insulate
retailers from lawful and normal competitive pressures generated by other retailers, nor an
intent to authorize suppliers, in response to such pressures created solely at the retail level,
to protect, discriminatorily, sales to one customer at the expense of other customers." Id.
at 523.
37 Id. at 524.
3"Id. at 525. Section 2 of the Clayton Act allowed as one defense to prohibited price
discriminations a showing that the price concession was "made in good faith to meet competition." Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Star. 730. "This proviso was found to
make the section practically unenforceable as a means of preventing injurious price discriminations between customers of the same seller, partly because the nature of the competition that might be met was not limited .... " Austin, Price Discrimination 93 (1959).
The present § 2(b) of the Act was explained by the House Judiciary Committee Report,
H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1936), "as a contraction of an exemption
now contained in section 2 of the Clayton Act which permits discrimination without limit
when made in good faith to meet competition . . . the proviso permits the seller to meet
the price actually previously offered by a local competitor. It permits him to go no further."
See Rowe, op. cit. supra note 11, at 208-15; Austin, op. cit. supra at 93-95.
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case, as to which we herein neither express nor intimate any opinion."3 This apparently noncommital note finds its significance in the
fact that the Court bothered at all to distinguish the situations. Mr.
Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart went even further in a
separate memorandum noting that they would have preferred to
remand the case to the FTC to afford an opportunity for the introduction of further evidence concerning the nature of Super Test's
supply arrangements.'

B. FTC Interpretation Of Sun Oil
The FTC interprets the Sun Oil decision as limiting the defense
to cases involving the meeting of direct, as distinguished from indirect, competition.'" Direct competition exists only when a competitor operating on the same functional level as the supplier
actually makes an offer to the customer of that supplier.' The
Commission supports its interpretation with two factors present in
the Court's opinion: (1) the theory that enterprises can be competitors only if operating on the same functional level and (2) the
argument that it makes no linguistic or practical sense to talk about
a supplier being able to meet the "equally low" price of a retailer.
The FTC's analysis, however, neglected equally important factors.
Acceptance of the direct competition theory renders meaningless
the distinction the Court drew between competition on the purely
retail level and competition by suppliers through their dealers or
by integrated supplier-retailers through their outlets." The distinction has meaning only if it is recognized that either an integrated
supplier-retailer or a supplier giving aid to its dealer competes
on the same functional level with the supplier attempting to assert
the defense, at least to the extent that the resulting retail price is not
a function of the retail outlet's own "superior merit and efficiency."
Furthermore, the "equally low price" the supplier attempts to meet
371 U.S. at 512 n.7.

oId. at 529. At publication, the Fifth Circuit has granted Sun's petition for a reopening of
the case and remanded t othe FTC for further proceedings. 1963 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 16654
(Nov. 12, 1963). In the petition, Sun attempts to show that Super Test (1) was a supplierretailer and (2) drew supplies from a major. In support of the first proposition, Sun cites a
number of instances in which Super Test distributed gasoline to stations with brand names
other than Super Test, giving it an aurora of a wholesale distributor. To prove the second
proposition, Sun exhibits records that show Super Test was supplied by Orange State Oil Co.
(controlled by Cities Service) and was given price aid by the supplier during the period
in question. National Petroleum News, May 1963, pp. 67-68.
' See also Discussion Note, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 50189 (May 14, 1963).
42According to the FTC, the seller must have specific advance knowledge of a competitor's actual offer to his purchaser before he may meet that offer in good faith. Forster
Mfg. Co., 1961-1963 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 16243, at 21082 (Jan. 3, 1963).
'3371 U.S. at 515.
"Id. at 512 n.7.
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is not the price at which the retailer sells, but the price at which
the retailer buys from another supplier or the internal price within
an integrated enterprise at which goods are transferred from one
level to another. Though this interpretation requires a somewhat
liberal construction of the phrase "equally low price," the cases
dealing with private brand competition provide evidence that the
courts are willing to interpret this phrase liberally."
The motive force behind the FTC's theory of direct and indirect
competition is the Commission's assertion that there must have been
an actual offer to the supplier's customer before it may in good faith
meet the competition.46 Although in Sun Oil the Court was very
careful to avoid deciding this issue, ' it is in this area that the conduit theory becomes a very useful tool of analysis. The real objection to the theory as presented by Sun was that no distinction was
made between the situation in which the retailer's price reflected
merely his efficiency as a retailer from that in which his price reflected
a subsidy from a supplier. This distinction, however, can be adequately made through an application of the functional level theory
of competition."' In this sense, the retailer operates as a conduit only
to the extent that his prices reflect the prices at which he acquires
goods from his supplier. The conduit theory, in its proper application, concerns only the question of whether there must be an actual
offer to a supplier's customers before aid can be given. In industries
in which such offers are seldom made;" i.e., those in which retailers
act at certain times as mere conduits through which suppliers compete with one another for customers rather than industries in which
suppliers compete against one another for retail outlets; the acceptance
of such a theory makes the section 2 (b) defense unavailable to the
members of that industry. Under these circumstances, the conduit
"5See the series of cases dealing with premium priced merchandise for examples of a
liberal interpretation of "equally low price." Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 363 U.S. 536
(1960), reversing 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), remanded, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961);
H. J. Heinz Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Gerber Prods. Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Standard Brands, Inc. v. FTC, 46 F.T.C. 1485 (1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951);
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948), rev'd on other grounds,
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), petition for
cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
4See note 42 supra.
47 371 U.S. at 529 n.19.
"Thus, a supplier is a competitor of an integrated supplier-retailer on the same functional level to the extent that the retail price is not a function of the superior merit and
efficiency of the purely retail operation. Similarly, a supplier is a competitor on the same
functional level of other suppliers to the extent that, through price aids, he enables his
retailer to set a price which is not a function of its own efficiency.
49 See note 32 supra and accompanying text; see also Rowe, op. cit. supra note 11, at
250-55.
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theory recognizes economic reality,"0 retains the validity of the Sun
Oil result, and makes the defense available to competitors regardless
of the market structure in which they operate.
V.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DEALER

AID

A. Area Plans Of Feathered Price Reductions
While denying the legality of Sun's attempt to render aid to
its retailer through selective price reductions which discriminated
against other Sun retail dealers, the Court suggested that other alternatives are open to gasoline suppliers, even in the narrow situation
in which the response is directed at a purely retail operation. The
Court directed the FTC to be tolerant toward the use of properly
feathered price reduction systems within carefully defined area submarkets,"1 while nevertheless making it clear that improperly designed or too sharply drawn feathering graduations fall within the
same ban as outright illegal discrimination."' Four difficulties attend
this approach to the problem: the inherent difficulty in designing
properly graduated feathering, the possible injury to primary line
competition, the possible injury to the competitor of the customer
(dealer), and the inevitable tendency to spread price warfare from
an individual competitive situation to a regional submarket. It is
very doubtful that any workable set of guidelines defining an area
submarket can be formulated. By its very nature the area submarket
concept lends itself only to case by case evaluation of competitive
circumstances. Perhaps the best the FTC will be able to do is to
abandon rigid formulas and attempt to evaluate realistically revelant
effects on competition and competitors. 3 In attempting to aid his
5""Most of the evidence seems clearly to demonstrate that a company offers discounts
to its dealers because its dealers are losing business to price-cutting competitors; since
the major suppliers compete among themselves and with independents primarily through
their dealers, the concessions are made in a very real sense in good faith to meet competition." De Chazeau & Kahn, Integration and Competition in the Petroleum Industry
480 (1959) (Emphasis added.)
"' 371 U.S. at 527.
'lid. at 527 n.16.
" Perhaps a partial clarification of this area will come from American Oil Co., 19611963 Trade Reg. Rep.
15961 (June 27, 1962), reversed, American Oil Co. v. FTC, 1963
Trade Cases 5 70,948 (7th Cir. 1963). During a local price war, American gave its independent dealers in Smyrna, Georgia larger discounts than were granted to competing dealers in the
adjacent town of Marietta. Pursuant to the plan, dubbed CPA (Competitive Price Allowances), the prices at which American sold to its dealers were designed to allow each dealer to
meet the competitive price in his own locality. Throughout the two week price war, the
differential between the Smyrna and Marietta dealers ranged from So to 11 '/2 per gallon.
The Commission found sufficient competitive injury to American's customers (dealers) in
Marietta to uphold the complaint. In a dissenting opinion, Commissioner Elman criticized
the decision on the ground that the Commission applied a rigid formula that "competition
between buyers" plus "substantial difference in price" equals "significant competitive ad-
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retailer, the oil supplier runs the risk that his area reduction constitutes an illegal discrimination causing injury to primary line competition." The Court specifically pointed out that nothing it said
involving secondary line competition was to be considered inconsistent with the principle that a difference in price even among noncompeting purchasers may be a "discrimination" under section 2 (a)
of the Act. 5 There is also the possibility that the company using
vantage" to the favored buyers, which in turn equals "probable injury to competition."
Id. at 20790. The Commissioner further stated:
My main difficulty with the majority opinion springs from its failure to
recognize and bring to bear an expert evaluation of the special and distinctive
effects on competition of a local, limited gasoline price war. The Commission
. . . has transformed a hard case into an easy one by applying an old well
worn formula taken from a different economic context which . . . is out of
place as applied to the facts of this situation. Id. at 20792.
The Supreme Court's admonishment in the Sun Oil case was that the "FTC and the courts
must make realistic appraisals of revelant competitive facts" in appraising the effects of
any price cut or the response to it, coupled with its statement that the "invocation of
mechanical word formulas cannot be made to substitute for adequate probative analysis,"
seems to be a repudiation of the formula applied in American Oil. 371 U.S. at 527 n.15
(citing Commissioner Elman's dissent).
"'Whether or not discriminatory prices have an illegal effect upon primary line competition depends on whether the facts and circumstances indicate that there is likely to
be substantial injury to competition among sellers. A price system that diverts trade to
the seller from his competitors, because sales are made to different customers at different
prices, has been condemned (Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945)), but the
mere capacity of the seller's system to divert trade is not proof per se of unlawful injury,
especially if other factors are involved. Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 166
Fed. 555 (D. Mass. 1909). The fact that other competitors have fared well in the face
of the discrimination, (Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 206 (1952)), the aggressive or defensive nature of the
price cut, (H. J. Heinz Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y.
1960)), and the relative market power of the competitor and the price cutter (Atlas
Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1959)) have
all been deemed revelant in determining whether there has been injury to competition on
the primary line. The Seventh Circuit reversed primarily on this basis.
"SFTC v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960), reversing 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir.
1959), remanded, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961). In this case, Anheuser-Busch reduced
its prices in the St. Louis area to the level at which local and regional beer was sold
while not making such reductions elsewhere. The Supreme Court held that such action
could have unlawful effects on primary line competition (between sellers on the same
functional level) even though there was no price discrimination between competing customers of the company. Thus, if Sun had followed the Court's suggestion and granted
feathered reductions within an area submarket in order to meet the competition of the
Super Test station, it might well have found itself facing a charge of price discrimination
involving injury to primary line competition. In Forster Mfg. Co., 1961-1963 Trade Reg.
Rep. 5 16243 (Jan. 3, 1963), the FTC laid down guidelines to determine in what cases
area pricing may not cause injury to primary line competition. Attempting to avoid injury
to secondary line competition, Forster met offers made to several of its purchasers by
extending the lower price to all buyers in the area. The Commission felt that this was
an improper approach for several reasons. (1) A meeting by Forster of actual offers to
the purchasers who had received them could not have possibly caused any additional
secondary line injury, since those purchasers were already buying at the lower price
from another source. (2) A counteroffer that simply matches someone else's offer and is
restricted to those particular buyers who have in fact received that offer adds nothing
to the sum total of primary line injury. (3) An area-wide response to individual competitive offers widens the impact area and increases the likelihood of competitive injury
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area pricing may be charged with an illegal act because injury has
been sustained by the competitors of its customers to whom it gave
price reductions."' Moreover, the difficulty with the feathered area
response is that it tends to spread what might have been an individual
competitive situation into a regional price war. When a supplier
gives reductions to dealers in the area, other suppliers by necessity
must respond with aid to their dealers, and they in turn face the
problem of defining submarkets and designing a proper feathering
at both the primary and secondary level. In regard to the likelihood of injury to secondary
line competition the Commission stated:
On the secondary level, there would always remain the likelihood that a few
buyers located on one side of the 'zone' line would compete with buyers
located on the other side. Respondents would have to continue widening the
circle of favored customers, perhaps until they encountered some natural
physical barrier to protect the non-favored from the favored buyers. On the
primary level injury can be expected to increase in direct proportion to the
number of customers receiving the spurious 'counteroffer.' Id. at 21086-87.
In an industry such as the oil industry, in which direct offers to a supplier's customer
are seldom made (see note 32 supra), the difficulty with this approach is immediately
obvious. In the Sun Oil case, the secondary level injury supposedly arose out of the fact
that Sun's nonfavored purchasers were subjected to the competition from a dealer carrying
their own brand, in addition to the competitive threat already present from Super Test.
The Court dwelled upon the fact that some customers would not buy Super Test gasoline
at the lower price, but would switch from one Sun station to the other when the Sunoco
price was reduced. In other words, the additional injury arose out of the difference in
brands rather than from the absence of an actual offer to the Sun station. In Forster,
the FTC, by assuming that no additional injury resulted because Forster's customers
could be supplied by another company at the equally low price, failed to take into
account the fact that customers of Forster's other purchasers might have the same preference
for brands supposedly exhibited by the customers of Sunoco. It is possible that there is
a hidden distinction between the two situations revolving around the fact that in the
Forster case the products of the competing suppliers were perfectly homogeneous, and thus
no preference for one brand over another was possible, but to develop stable and accurate
guidelines based upon this kind of distinction would be utterly impossible.
In discussing the implications for the primary line of an area response, the Commission
stated that there would be a violation "where respondents, at the time, are selling in two
or more trading areas and in the trading area in which such products are sold at the
lower price are in competition with any other seller who then and thereafter enjoyed a substantially smaller volume of sales than the total volume of sales enjoyed by respondent."
Id. at 21090-091. According to the Commission, price variations would not violate the
order if (1) respondents had no weaker competitor in the area where the favored customer
was located, (2) the lower price could be cost justified, or (3) the lower price had been
offered to the favored customer in good faith to meet the equally low price offered to
that particular customer by a competitor of respondents. A supplier in the position of
Sun, attempting to use the feathered market approach to meet an individual competitive
situation, could do so only in an area where there were no weaker competitors. This
condition effectively emasculates any attempt at reliance upon area responses by gasoline
suppliers, for within any area there will ordinarily be at least one supplier that can be
classified as a weaker competitor.
" Pure Oil Co., 1961-1963 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 16111 (Sept. 28, 1962). Pure had
granted price aids to all its dealers in the area who agreed to a plan of posting prices
within 10 of the independent dealers in the area. Pure avoided any secondary level violation
by granting the reduction to all dealers who were in competition with one another. It
was not charged with a primary line violation. Nevertheless, Pure's discrimination was
found to be illegal because it caused injury to other retailers in competition with Pure's
customers (dealers). The Commission stated:

The injury here was not to Pure's direct competitors, but to the retail
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approach. With the existing tendency of price wars to spread, the
avenue of action the Court presents is destined to increase this tendency markedly. Therefore, while the area submarket approach
might be the appropriate response to area price wars in which there
is neither chance to confine the price cutting to an individual competitive situation nor substantial danger of a primary line violation,
the difficulties inherent in its application to individual isolated instances of price cutting preclude its general use.
One type of area plan approved by an FTA examiner is the SCRP
(Suggested Competitive Retail Price) plan employed by the Standard
Oil Company."' The only question presented was whether the plan
constituted an unfair method of competition under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act." (Its legality under the RobinsonPatman Act has not been determined.) The examiner ruled that
pursuant to the plan Standard had determined an appropriate differential between branded and unbranded products as a class. The
differential reflected realistically the difference in public acceptance
between the two classes and took into consideration the posted prices
of unbranded resellers, discounts from those posted prices, and the
value of stamps, premiums, and other give-aways. Standard then
determined a "suggested competitive retail price," and the price to
its dealers was determined by a percentage discount from this price.
All dealers in a trading area were charged the same price, regardless of their resale prices. The Commission found no unfair trade
private brand operators, who were in direct competition with Pure's dealers
and other major brand dealers. . . . section 2(a) clearly prohibits such discrimination where the effect may be to 'injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them.' If the private brands be
considered as Pure's competitors, the injury is to competition with the one
who granted the discrimination. If the private brands be considered as Pure's
dealer's competitors, the injury is to competition with its customers. Id. at
20930.
Clearly, according to the Sun Oil decision, the violation could not be classified as one of a
primary line nature because retailers cannot be competitors of suppliers. The decision must
stand on the basis that it was an illegal act for Pure to cause injury, by giving price
aid to all its dealers in a submarket, to a retailer who, although not a customer of Pure,
was a competitor of Pure's customers. Although Pure's action was not a response to
meet the "equally low price of a competitor," the principle involved would equally
affect a supplier faced with a situation similar to that which Sun Oil faced. A supplier
in the position of Sun, by granting area price reductions to a number of its dealers in
order to meet an individual competitive situation between one of them and a nearby
retail outlet, would, almost by definition, injure retail competitors of its other dealers
in the area. For a contrary view, see note 33 supra.
" Standard Oil Co., 1961-1963 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 16128 (Oct. 5, 1962). The Commission recently took the case under advisement after hearing an FTC lawyer call Indiana
Standard's plan "one of the most subtle price-fixing schemes" he had seen. National Petroleum News, Nov. 1963, p. 71.
838 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
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practice because the dealers were left with complete freedom to set
their retail prices and the price they paid Standard was not conditioned on their choice. There still may be some question as to
whether such a plan could result in either a primary line violation
or injury to competitors of Standard's dealers. Presumably, there
would be no violation within the latter category since the price is
designed merely to be competitive with those of unbranded products, taking into consideration the customary differential. But the
very fact that Standard charged a lower price in one area than in
another would lend support, under the "Anheuser-Busch doctrine,""9
to a claim of primary line injury, especially if some of the suppliers
in the area could be classified as weaker competitors of Standard. 0
B. Consignment Agreements

One other practice that has been attempted by oil suppliers consists of consignment arrangements with their dealers. Traditionally,
consignment agreements have been upheld as legally valid marketing
arrangements, 1 but recently they have been under attack from both
the courts and the FTC. Consignment agreements with individual
dealers, as well as blanket arrangements, have come under fire. In
another Sun Oil Co. decision,"2 the Commission held that Sun's consignment arrangement with a group of dealers in the Norfolk,
Virginia area was a fiction and a subterfuge by which an unlawful
price fixing arrangement was implemented. Proof showed that it was
both a vertical and a horizontal price fixing device in violation of
the Federal Trade Commission Act."3 The evidence consisted of two
factors. First, Sun had forced its dealers to accept the consignment
plan by giving them an all or nothing proposition. Either they would
accept the consignment arrangement or else continue to pay the
present tankwagon price even though Sun reduced the retail price
in its company-owned and consignee stations. Second, the consignment agreement had been negotiated with the dealers as a group
rather than individually, allowing Sun to act as a clearing house
through which the dealers among themselves and in each other's
presence could and did pledge to fix prices horizontally while Sun,
in the presence of the dealers, pledged to fix prices vertically." A
59See note 55 sirpra.
60 Ibid.
6 Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956) (ruling out application of either S 2(a) or S 2(e) to
consignees); cf. FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568, 581 (1923).
"Sun Oil Co., 1961-1963 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 16418 (May 15, 1963).
6338 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
"Sun Oil Co., 1961-1963 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 16418, at 21279-80 (May 15, 1963).
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slightly different situation was presented in Atlantic Ref. Co." In
the area in which Atlantic offered its consignment plan, it employed
a dual marketing system, selling to some dealers directly and to
others through distributors. Being able to enter consignment agreements only with those to whom it sold directly, Atlantic granted discounts sufficient to equalize prices to those distributors who were
able to induce their customers to follow the prices set by Atlantic
in its consignee stations. The Commission ruled that Atlantic's scheme
was an illegal device to fix prices. The basis for the decision centered
on three separate factors. Atlantic's take it or leave it proposition
offered to its dealers constituted economic coercion. The agreement
with the distributors constituted an illegal price fixing arrangement.
Finally, the consignment distribution program was not Atlantic's
regular method of selling its products, but was used only at irregular
intervals and in certain markets during price wars. The temporary
nature of the program and the shifting back and forth of customers
from dealer status to agency stations emphasized that the plan was
a device to fix prices rather than a good faith marketing method.
Area consignment agreements constitute price fixing schemes if (1)
elements of economic coercion enter into the negotiation, (2) agreements are made with dealers of an area en masse, and (3) they do
not constitute the regular marketing procedure of the supplier, but
are only entered into in times of emergency to meet the threat generated by a price war.
In the Simplicity-Pattern decision," the Supreme Court indicated
that a consignee is a "purchaser" within the meaning of the law.
This interpretation marks a change in the law which could have
important implications for consignment agreements." Apparently,
the Court treated a consignee as a purchaser within the meaning of
section 2 (e) of the Clayton Act." In effect, this would overrule an
earlier decision that section 2 (a) was inapplicable to claimed discrimination between a purchaser and a consignee of the same supplier." On the other hand, it lends force to the decision in Ludwig
as 1961-1963 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 16422

(May 16, 1963).

'FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
7 See Discussion Note, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 50125 (Feb. 13, 1962).
66FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959). The Court's rationale that a
consignee is a "purchaser" indicates that a consignment agreement may violate § 2(e) of the
Robinson-Patman Act by constituting a discrimination "in favor of one purchaser . . .
by contract to furnish . . . any services or facilities connected with the processing,
handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded
to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e)
(Supp. IV

1959-62).

esStudents Book Co. v. Washintgon Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956).
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0 that the placing of former customers
v. American Greetings Corp."

of a competing seller on a consignment basis in order to induce such
customers to transfer their business to the seller constitutes a prima
facie case of indirect price discrimination which section 2 (a) covers.
In Ludwig, on remand," it was established that consignment deliveries can be made in good faith to meet competition within the
meaning of section 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act if offered in
response to a similar offer by another supplier. The issue is still in
doubt, but it appears that under existing law a gasoline supplier
cannot enter into a consignment agreement with one or several of its
dealers and then, within the meaning of "competitor" as defined in
the Sun Oil case, meet in good faith the price of a purely retail dealer
if such agreement would constitute discrimination among its own purchasers. This is the result even if no economic coercion of the dealer
were involved and no area agreement existed that could be construed
as a conspiracy to fix prices. Once a consignee is called a purchaser, the
consignment agreement itself (not the price that is set as the result of
the agreement) constitutes a prima facie case of indirect price discrimination against the supplier's other purchasers. Since it is the
price that is set afterwards that constitutes the meeting of the
equally low price of a competitor, the good faith defense applies only
to the injury that results from the supplier's activities pursuant to
the consignment agreement and not to the actual formation of the
agreement. The good faith defense would be available only in the
case in which a competing supplier had offered a similar arrangement
to the supplier's own dealer or perhaps a dealer in competition with
its own dealer.

C. Vertical Integration
Other devices failing, the major oil companies, in order to protect their retail outlets from price cutting activities, might well be
forced into combining direct retailing with their other operations.
The main factor underlying the majors' failure to operate their
marketing activities on this basis at the present time is the threat
that chain store taxes might possibly be applied to such product distribution systems."" However, once the advantages involved in being
able to protect individual stations from the effects of price wars is
judged to outweigh the disadvantages of the additional tax burden,
70264 F.2d 286, 288 (6th Cir. 1959).
7' 282 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1960).
72 Cassady, op. cit. supra note 28, at 237. See Gulf Ref. Co. v. Fox, 297 U.S. 381 (1936);
Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87 (1935); see also Bedford v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
104 Colo. 424, 91 P.2d 475 (1939).

